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Reading On Certainty through the
Lens of Cavell: Scepticism,
Dogmatism and the ‘Groundlessness
of our Believing’
Chantal Bax
Abstract
While Cavell is well known for his reinterpretation of the later
Wittgenstein, he has never really engaged himself with post-Investigations
writings like On Certainty. This collection may, however, seem to
undermine the profoundly anti-dogmatic reading of Wittgenstein that
Cavell has developed. In addition to apparently arguing against what
Cavell calls ‘the truth of skepticism’ – a phrase contested by other
Wittgensteinians – On Certainty may seem to justify the rejection of
whoever dares to question one’s basic presuppositions. According to On
Certainty, or so it seems, the only right response to someone with different
certainties is a reproach like ‘Fool!’ or ‘Heretic!’. This article aims to show
that On Certainty need not be taken to prove Cavell wrong. It explains
that Wittgenstein, in line with the first two parts of The Claim of Reason,
does not reject scepticism out of hand but rather questions the sceptic’s
self-understanding. Using arguments from Part Three of The Claim, the
article moreover argues that a confrontation with divergence calls for self-
examination rather than self-righteousness. Precisely because Wittgenstein
acknowledges ‘the groundlessness of our believing’ or, in Cavellian terms,
‘the truth of skepticism’, he is not the authoritarian thinker that some have
taken him to be.
Keywords: Wittgenstein; Cavell; On Certainty; scepticism; dogmatism;
foundationalism
1. Cavell and On Certainty
While his writings can by no means be reduced to a mere commentary
on the Philosophical Investigations, Stanley Cavell has without a doubt
offered one of the most original and innovative contributions to
scholarship on the later Wittgenstein. Many have for instance welcomed
his reinterpretation of the Wittgensteinian method, according to which
the appeal to ordinary language never puts an abrupt and non-negotiable
end to philosophical debate but rather always invites a further
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exploration of our everyday practices. There has likewise been approval
of Cavell’s related claim that Wittgensteinian criteria are not meant to
dismiss scepticism out of hand, and that those only trying to prove the
sceptic wrong risk failing to see what scepticism can teach us about our
relationship to the world around us. The Wittgenstein who emerges from
writings like The Claim of Reason is engaged in an unrelenting quest for
self-knowledge and takes this undertaking to be ethical through and
through – a sharp contrast with the dogmatic and reactionary thinker
who figured in the critiques of Herbert Marcuse and Ernest Gellner, or
who more recently makes an appearance in the work of Alain Badiou.1
From this perspective, it can be regretted that Cavell has so far never
really engaged himself with Wittgenstein’s post-Investigations remarks,
most notably those collected in On Certainty. Cavell explicitly and rightly
states that he is under no obligation to comment on Wittgenstein’s every
single observation, even less so because he does not consider himself to
simply or only be an interpreter of Wittgenstein.2 Even so, a number of
the entries in On Certainty may at first sight appear to undermine the
Wittgenstein-inspired outlook that Cavell has developed. The collection
first of all contains Wittgenstein’s most detailed discussion of scepticism,
and the main moral thereof could be taken to be that sceptical doubt can
be rejected without further ado because doubt presupposes certainty:
every question we raise is parasitic on a host of presuppositions that
always already go unquestioned and doubting these presuppositions
would be nonsensical or unreasonable. Cavell’s claim that Wittgenstein
can be said to affirm the ‘truth of skepticism’3 has consequently been con-
tested, for instance by Malcolm Turvey and Marie McGinn.4
Yet the challenge On Certainty poses to Cavell’s reading of
Wittgenstein is not limited to the issue of sceptical philosophy.
Wittgenstein may seem to use the same insights about the taken-
for-granted basis of human knowledge, not just to preclude each and
every conversation with the sceptic, but to justify the unconditional
rejection of whoever begs to differ with what one takes to stand fast. Cer-
tainties make investigation and discussion possible in the first place and
as such, Wittgenstein appears to argue, they prohibit level-headed
engagement with anyone who suggests that one’s basic assumptions may
not always already go without saying – be it by explicitly asking for a jus-
tification of one’s certainties or by simply testifying to a different outlook
on things. According to some of the entries in On Certainty, or so it
seems, the only right response to someone who doubts or disagrees with
one’s fundamental presuppositions is something along the lines of ‘Rub-
bish!’, ‘Fool!’ or ‘Heretic!’.5
These post-Investigations writings, then, could at first glance be taken
to invalidate Cavell’s understanding of Wittgenstein as a thoroughly
anti-dogmatic thinker who never evades discussion and seizes every
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
2
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ha
nta
l B
ax
] a
t 0
6:4
5 2
2 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
opportunity to investigate where he stands with regard to himself and to
(real or imagined) others. My aim in this paper is to show that On
Certainty need not be taken to prove Cavell wrong, or to show that a
Cavellian reading can be given of these writings, too.
To this end, I will first of all give an overview of the main arguments in
On Certainty itself. I will explain how Wittgenstein’s discussion of Moore
can be said to acknowledge the moral of scepticism, though I will by and
large refrain from using Cavellian terms in the second section. This will
rather be the aim of the third section, which proceeds to read On Cer-
tainty through the lens of Cavell. I will use the arguments from Part Two
of The Claim to explain that Wittgenstein does not dogmatically dismiss
the sceptic by stating that he or she has transgressed certain pre-given
bounds of sense. Wittgenstein rather questions the sceptic’s self-under-
standing – which is also why his affirmation of the truth of scepticism
does not make him into a proponent of the sceptical cause. For as Cavell
maintains, the truth of scepticism is not exactly what the sceptic takes it
to be. In the fourth section, I will then turn to the entries in which
Wittgenstein seems to silence, not just the sceptical philosopher, but any-
one who dares to challenge what one takes to stand fast. I will argue that,
precisely because of the truth of scepticism, Wittgenstein should not be
taken to justify the exclusion of diverging voices out of hand. Applying
some of the arguments from Part Three of The Claim, I will explain that
an encounter with someone who does not shares one’s certainties calls
for self-examination rather than self-righteousness.
Hence, I will offer a reading of On Certainty that supports and
elaborates on Cavell’s understanding of the Investigations, thereby
defending the Wittgenstein that emerges from his work. In the conclud-
ing section I will moreover point out that a Cavellian reading of On Cer-
tainty also allows for a more sophisticated understanding of the concept
of certainty itself. Given that there are limits to what one can do in a
single paper, however, I will not explicitly discuss competing interpreta-
tions of Wittgenstein, either in the last or in the other sections; I will
reserve such discussion for the footnotes. For similar reasons, I will focus
first and foremost on only one of Cavell’s numerous writings, namely,
the aforementioned The Claim of Reason. This after all remains the
most important and extensive source for Cavell’s anti-dogmatic reading
of the later Wittgenstein.
2. On Certainty and Anti-scepticism
Not unlike the first chapters of The Claim, On Certainty starts out as a
discussion of anti-scepticism rather than of scepticism itself, taking issue
with G. E. Moore’s attempt to refute the sceptic. While Wittgenstein
READING ON CERTAINTY THROUGH THE LENS OF CAVELL
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agrees with Moore that the sceptic’s questions need not bring all our
thinking and acting to a stop, he feels that something is amiss with
Moore’s insistence that he indisputably knows things like ‘There exists at
present a living human body’ (Moore, 1959a: p. 33) and ‘Here is one
hand’ (Moore, 1959b: p. 144). It is moreover precisely in the course of
his critique of Moore that Wittgenstein is able to formulate several
important insights into the nature of human knowledge – several of
which the sceptic can in a sense be said to share.
Wittgenstein first of all observes that we normally only say that we
know something when we have sufficient grounds for our statements, or
when we at any rate know how we will be able to back them up.6
Knowledge claims, namely, can also be disputed. Someone might ask me
how I know that Egyptian fenugreek seed caused the E.coli outbreak in
Germany, or that this watch is a genuine Rolex. My subsequent
explanation may or may not convince my interlocutor, who might go on
to provide grounds to the contrary, which in turn may or may not serve
to convince me. Knowledge claims, then, are things we doubt and discuss
and about which we try to come to an agreement, though we may not
always succeed in doing so.
This is not quite the case with the statements Moore lists in his
attempt to refute the sceptic, Wittgenstein points out. Moore’s argument,
for a start, precisely makes use of the fact that we would normally not
question someone saying ‘This is my hand’ (though we might wonder
why this person feels the need to make this claim in the first place).7
Wittgenstein explains: ‘The propositions presenting what Moore “knows”
are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should
believe the contrary’ (OC: x 93). Hence, when Moore says that he knows
that the earth has existed for many years, he means ‘that any reasonable
person in [his] position would also know it, that it would be a piece of
unreason to doubt it’ (OC: x 325). Yet if a certain statement is not
considered to be eligible for doubt and disagreement, it is unlike the
statements we normally call knowledge claims. Far from being immune
from discussion, it is precisely its connection to questions and investiga-
tions that makes a statement into a claim to knowledge: ‘Where there is
no doubt there is no knowledge either’ (OC: x 121).
In a similar vein, Moore’s statements differ from ordinary knowledge
claims in lacking clear procedures for justification, or in lacking justifica-
tion procedures of any kind. For the facts Moore lists are not only things
we normally do not question, we would not even know how someone’s
having two hands or a body could be proven to be true: ‘Moore chooses
precisely a case in which we all seem to know the same as he, and with-
out being able to say how’ (OC: x 84). Yet if we cannot say how we
know something to be true, we can strictly speaking not be said to know
it either. ‘One says “I know” when one is ready to give compelling
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grounds’ (OC: x 243), Wittgenstein explains, so when compelling grounds
are absent, the label ‘knowledge’ does not truly apply.8
Yet these considerations do not bring Wittgenstein to brush Moore’s
statements aside as being without any use or interest. On his view, the
fact that we typically would not doubt that Moore has two hands, or
would not think about asking him to prove that he has a body, shows
that Moore-style propositions play a very special role in our epistemo-
logical practices. For as Wittgenstein argues, at some point questions
and investigations come to an end.9 When a scientist conducts an experi-
ment, she questions lots of things, but not whether her microscope really
exists or whether the numbers she writes down may not suddenly
rearrange themselves.10 This is not out of negligence: if she were to
investigate all of these things, she would never be able to get her
research off the ground. This holds for non-scientific, everyday practices
as well. We would not be able to make any claim or perform any action
if we would have to answer all possible questions about them before-
hand: ‘We just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are
forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the
hinges must stay put’ (OC: x 343). And, Wittgenstein finds, it is precisely
this hinge-like function that the facts Moore lists fulfil. His emphatic
insistence that he simply knows that the earth exists indicates that, here,
he ‘[has] arrived at the rock bottom of [his] convictions’ (OC: x 248).
Rather than expressing knowledge claims, Moore points to something
that makes knowledge possible in the first place.
In order to bring this out more fully, On Certainty needs to make a
number of corrections to Moore’s statements. First and perhaps fore-
most, Wittgenstein tries to find a new terminology for Moore’s
purported knowledge claims. Being exempt from doubt and justification,
as stated, the label ‘knowledge’ does not truly apply to them, and
Wittgenstein accordingly looks for a more appropriate characterization.
While he does not always succeed in avoiding the word ‘knowledge’ for
Moore-style claims, and tries out several alternative descriptions, there is
one term that above all seems to capture the specific nature of Moore’s
statements. The things we unhesitatingly take for granted in everything
we do and say, Wittgenstein submits, are not instances of knowledge but
of certainty.11 These presuppositions collectively make up a picture of
the world12 that informs all our enquiring and asserting but that is not
questioned itself; we rather always simply and confidently take these
things for a fact. So where Moore says ‘I know’ it would have been more
accurate to say: ‘I am familiar with it as a certainty’ (OC: x 272).
Yet according to Wittgenstein, Moore-style statements do not only not
amount to knowledge claims, they are in fact not of a propositional
nature at all.13 That is to say, it is precisely by normally going
unexpressed that my conviction that there are external objects serves to
READING ON CERTAINTY THROUGH THE LENS OF CAVELL
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underlie my doings and sayings, from my disputing the date of an Attic
vase to my playing a game of basketball. To be sure, a certainty may at
some point become the topic of discussion – this has for instance hap-
pened to Wittgenstein’s own conviction that it is impossible for humans
to go to the moon.14 A certainty may also be explicitly formulated for
purposes of instruction, like when we say ‘This is a hand’ to a child we
are teaching English.15 In such a case, however, these statements no
longer or not yet function as certainties. In normal circumstances, mak-
ing a certainty explicit interrupts rather than facilitates the everyday flow
of life. Hence, Wittgenstein states that in so far as giving grounds comes
to and end, ‘the end is not certain propositions’ striking us immediately
as true … it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game’
(OC: x 204). While certainties form the basis for our intellectual pursuits,
they are themselves of a non-intellectual or practical nature.
In the course of these observations, Wittgenstein is also able to
explain why we are so certain of the things Moore lists, even though we
are unable to give grounds for them. For as Wittgenstein points out,
there is also another sense in which our basic presuppositions are non-
intellectual. Rather than having acquired certainties after a process of
painstaking investigation and experimentation, we more or less automati-
cally come to subscribe to them in the course of our upbringing:
I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its cor-
rectness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness.
No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish
between true and false. (OC: x 94)
Indeed, while certainties like ‘This is a hand’ are taught explicitly, most
of what we take to stand fast is transmitted in an implicit manner.
Children for instance ‘do not learn that books exist, that armchairs exist
… – they learn to fetch books, sit in armchairs’ (OC: x 476) and thereby
come to take the former for granted. It is thus simply by being a mem-
ber of a particular community that a person has the certainties she has;
she has incorporated them as she was initiated into the practices of her
fellow men.
This gives Wittgenstein all the more reason to distinguish certainties
from claims to knowledge. For as stated, knowledge claims are things we
debate and discuss with the aim of reaching agreement, but without the
guarantee of doing so. When it comes to certainties, by contrast, the
members of a community do not have to reach an agreement: they
already are in agreement, and in a more profound way than an explicit
quest for concurrence could ever achieve. Wittgenstein notes: ‘“We are
quite sure of it” does not mean just that every single person is certain of
it, but that we belong to a community which is bound together by
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science and education’ (OC: x 298). We would even consider someone
who does not share our certainties an outcast or outsider, someone with
whom we would not know how to reason.16 Moore’s argument, as stated,
precisely draws on the fact that members of a community always already
take the same things for granted, but this is also precisely why his
statements cannot be said to amount to knowledge claims. The
agreement here is of a very different kind.17
3. The Truth and Falsity of Scepticism
To come back to my main aim in this article, the findings of the previous
section can all be summarized in Cavellian terms. Moore’s anti-sceptical
protestations inadvertently demonstrate what can with Cavell – and pace
critics like Turvey and McGinn – be called the truth of scepticism: at the
most fundamental level, ‘Our relation to the world … is not one of
knowing’ (CR: p. 45).18 For as Wittgenstein’s discussion of Moore makes
clear, our intellectual pursuits are made possible by our unthinkingly
already taking a whole conglomerate of things to stand fast. This does
not come in the form of our consciously or even tacitly approving of
certain empirical propositions. What Wittgenstein calls ‘certainties’ only
show themselves in the way we unhesitatingly talk and act; the founda-
tion of our knowledge consists of nothing over and above ‘our shared
commitments and responses’ (CR: p. 179).
There is moreover no justification for the things we take for granted
than that we have come to incorporate them in the course of our
upbringing, which cannot be called a proper justification at all. As Cavell
explains: ‘Wittgenstein’s discovery, or rediscovery, is of the depth of
convention in human life; the conventionality of human nature itself’
(CR: p. 111). In On Certainty, this comes out in Wittgenstein’s observa-
tion that we both share our certainties with and owe them to the other
members of our community. Both in the sense that there is nothing
beyond our own actions and reactions to serve as a basis for knowledge,
and in the sense that these certainties are inherited rather purposively
obtained, Wittgenstein maintains that we have to ‘realize the groundless-
ness of our believing’ (OC: x 166).
In order to flesh out this Cavellian reading of On Certainty more fully,
let me first of all use Cavell’s insights to make sense of the particular
mix of foundational and anti-foundational language that Wittgenstein
employs, talking about the preconditions for human knowledge on the
one hand and about the groundlessness of our believing on the other.
Explained along Cavellian lines, Wittgenstein can be said to investigate
the foundations of our everyday practices, but the foundations he lays
bare are of a very particular kind.19 Wittgenstein’s view of knowledge,
READING ON CERTAINTY THROUGH THE LENS OF CAVELL
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Cavell maintains, is ‘anthropological, or even anthropomorphic’ (CR: p.
118); he takes it to ‘[depend] upon nothing more and nothing less than
shared forms of life’ (CR: p. 168). Wittgenstein thus offers a human
foundation for human knowledge, and this is bound to dissatisfy anyone
who holds that only something unaffected by the all-too human can have
a foundational function. From that perspective, the grounds described in
On Certainty do not make for grounds at all, for they are only grounds
in so far as we uphold them. Or as Wittgenstein characterizes his
particular brand of foundationalism: ‘one might almost say that these
foundation-walls are carried by the whole house’ (OC: x 248).
This also explains why Cavell’s insistence that Wittgenstein discovers
a kernel of truth in scepticism all the same does not make him into a
proponent of the sceptical cause.20 Read through the lens of Cavell, the
sceptic precisely assumes that an anthropomorphic foundation cannot be
a true foundation. She will only let her doubts be eased if we show her
something independent and a-historical underlying our language games.
Yet that there are no such grounds to offer does not mean that the scep-
tic is right in all respects, Wittgenstein maintains. It is not just the case
that our practices cannot be justified by reference to pre-given facts –
they do not need such grounds either: ‘What I need to shew is that a
doubt is not necessary even when it is possible. That the possibility of
the language-game doesn’t depend on everything being doubted that can
be doubted’ (OC: x 392). Or to put it in the words of Cavell, if our rela-
tion to the world is not one of knowing, ‘it is also true that we do not
fail to know such things’ (CR: p. 45).
Hence, while On Certainty can, with Cavell, be said to underscore the
truth of scepticism, it should, with Cavell, also be said offer ‘a reinter-
pretation of what skepticism is, or threatens’ (CR: p. 7). At this point, I
want to turn to Part Two of The Claim of Reason, where Cavell pre-
cisely examines why scepticism, if it is not completely false, cannot be
completely true either. This will not only serve to get a final grasp on
the idea of the truth of scepticism as applied to On Certainty – it will
also show that, read through the lens of Cavell, Wittgenstein does not
dogmatically silence the sceptical philosopher, even if he doubts the
meaningfulness of her questions. For as I explained in the introduction,
On Certainty’s seeming dogmatism is another reason that this collection
could be taken to undermine Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein.
To very briefly summarize the most relevant steps here, Cavell first of
all returns to his earlier findings about the inability of ordinary language
philosophy to provide a direct refutation of the sceptic. To bluntly tell
her that her question normally does not arise does not only violate the
insight that ordinary language has no hard and fast rules,21 the sceptic
also knows very well that her query is somewhat out of the ordinary.
She will accordingly only feel that her question has been begged when
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
8
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ha
nta
l B
ax
] a
t 0
6:4
5 2
2 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
she is told that everyday language has no place for it; on her view, this
simply means ‘that ordinary language has itself been shown not fully
trustworthy’ (CR: p. 164). Even so, Cavell explains, the success of the
sceptic’s inquiry crucially depends on its following the course of an
ordinary investigation. For even if the question ‘How do you know this
is a hand?’ normally does not arise, once it is raised we are expected to
take the steps we normally take when someone asks us how we know
something. And for whatever basis we give the sceptic will then be able
to provide another ground for doubt (e.g. ‘Because I see it’ – ‘But [you]
don’t see all of it’ [CR: p. 144]).
Here, however, it becomes clear that the sceptic is simultaneously
required to diverge from normal investigative practices in an essential
way. Investigations are usually undertaken because there is a specific
reason to have a closer look at a particular claim, which also gives us an
indication as to where to direct our inquiries. Yet so far, Cavell points
out, it is unclear why the sceptic asks us about our knowledge of our
hands – what is more, if she would give a more precise reason for her
question, it would immediately lose all sceptical force. Her question,
namely, would then simply become a specific question about a specific
issue on one specific occasion, and nothing follows from such a question
about the fate of human knowledge as such. Cavell concludes:
[The skeptic’s investigation] must be the investigation of a concrete
claim if its procedure is to be coherent; it cannot be the investiga-
tion of a concrete claim if its conclusion is to be general. Without
that coherence it would not have the obviousness it has seemed to
have; without that generality its conclusion would not be sceptical.
(CR: p. 220)
Explained along Cavellian lines, in other words, sceptical doubt is not
senseless because we always already know beforehand where to draw
the line between what can and what cannot be questioned.22 It is rather
the case that when we probe the sceptic’s questions – instead of rejecting
them out of hand – they either turn out to not express any clear doubts
at all, or show themselves to be of a perfectly everyday and therefore
non-sceptical kind.
Something similar holds for Moore’s (purported) claims to knowledge.
Wittgenstein is not claiming that Moore has no right to ever say things
like ‘I know this is a hand’, or as he could have stated with Cavell: ‘I am
in no way hoping … to convince anyone that certain statements cannot
be made or ought not be made’ (CR: p. 212). The argument rather is
that simply saying ‘I know this is a hand’ by itself does not achieve any-
thing. In order for someone to understand what you mean by those
words, it has to be made clear what your point in saying them is: ‘If
READING ON CERTAINTY THROUGH THE LENS OF CAVELL
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someone says, “I know that that’s a tree” I may answer: “Yes, that is a
sentence. An English sentence. And what is it supposed to be doing?”’
(OC: x 352).23 Moore’s claim is thus not so much nonsensical as
meaningless; it still remains to be seen what he means his words to say.
However, once a more concrete reason and context are provided for his
statement, it becomes an ordinary knowledge claim that cannot bear the
weight of supporting human epistemology as a whole: ‘As soon as I
think of an everyday use of the sentence instead of a philosophical one,
its meaning becomes clear and ordinary’ (OC: x 347).24 Like the sceptic’s
question, Moore’s statement has to be specific in order to count as a
proper knowledge claim, yet as a concrete claim, it does not accomplish
what he wants it to.
On Certainty, then, is not trying to dismiss either Moore or the sceptic
beforehand, in spite of what some of the remarks about the nonsensicali-
ty of their statements may suggest, and in spite of Wittgenstein’s insight
that certainties normally go unquestioned and unexpressed. Indeed, it is
now possible to reformulate a point I already made in the previous
section: it is not the case that certainties can never be described or made
explicit, it is just that there always has to be a reason for doing so; think
of the aforementioned instances of instruction, or think of situations, as
Cavell points out and I will discuss more fully in the next section, in
which ‘[our] attunement [in forms of life] is threatened or lost’ (CR: p.
34). Yet as these very reasons indicate, when certainties are made
explicit they not yet or no longer function as certainties. For some
reason or other, some of the things we always already take for granted
do not go without saying anymore, if only temporarily.
4. Of Fools and Heretics
After explaining that On Certainty is about the groundlessness of our
believing or about the human foundations of human knowledge, I have
argued, with the help of Cavell, that Wittgenstein does not set out to
suppress the voices of the sceptical and the anti-sceptical philosopher.
My arguments so far may however sound rather hollow in the light of a
number of remarks that have not yet been discussed. For even if
Wittgenstein cannot be said to brusquely brush the claims and questions
of Moore and the sceptic aside, he seems to do just that when the
content rather than the justification of our certainties is questioned,
remarking: ‘One might simply say “O, rubbish!” to someone who wanted
to make objections to the propositions that are beyond doubt. That is,
not reply to him but admonish him’ (OC: x 495). Such a response seems
justified by the fact that certainties, making investigation and discussion
possible in the first place, can as such not be the topic of a reasoned
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debate. When confronted with a different outlook on things, Wittgen-
stein may consequently appear to argue, people can only revert to not-so
rational means: ‘Where two principles really do meet which cannot be
reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool
and heretic’ (OC: x 611).
Remarks such as these may seem to undermine what I have argued in
the foregoing, for if Wittgenstein condones the unconditional rejection
of whoever dares to question what one takes to stand fast, why would he
acknowledge something like the truth of scepticism? Indeed, it appears
that, on Wittgenstein’s view, questions about one’s certainties need
never give one pause and only make one hold on to one’s groundless
views all the firmer. This would mean that he is exactly the reactionary
thinker that critics like Marcuse and Badiou have made him out to be,
and that Cavell’s anti-dogmatic reading simply misrepresents the true
nature of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Yet as I will show, there is a
Cavellian moral to be drawn from the remarks just quoted as well.
It should first of all be noted that Wittgenstein does not maintain that
the only right response to someone who questions one’s certainties is
‘Rubbish!’, ‘Fool!’ or ‘Heretic!’. We might be inclined to respond in this
way because what is as stake are the very foundations of our everyday
practices, yet as Cavell remarks in his discussion of Kripke in The
Argument of the Ordinary: ‘What I am inclined to say is precisely not
something I necessarily go on to say’ (AO: p. 71). When confronted with
someone who is ‘contradicting [one’s] fundamental attitudes’, as Witt-
genstein accordingly states elsewhere in On Certainty, one might just
‘have to put up with’ (OC: x 238) this deviance. Or as The Claim
explains, there can be crossroads at which ‘we have to conclude that on
this point we are simply different’ (CR: p. 19). That such a response is
possible too means that, rather than always already reverting to name-
calling, it should be said to be a practical question how we will approach
someone contradicting our fundamental attitudes.25 Depending on sev-
eral factors like our relation to this person26 and the certainty at issue,
we might react in any one of several possible ways.
Moreover, that we might be inclined to say things like ‘Fool!’ and
‘Heretic!’ in response to an objection to our certainties does not mean
that we are justified or licensed to do so.27 That is to say, Wittgenstein’s
remark that one might admonish rather than reply to a contradicting
voice is first and foremost motivated by his holding that it would be
inappropriate to try and provide grounds in support of what one takes to
stand fast. Certainties, namely – to once more repeat this Wittgenstein-
ian insight – form the foundations on the basis of which arguments are
given and assessed, but they can themselves not be supported by means
of argumentation. It is for this reason – but it is also only for this reason
– that it would be more appropriate to admonish a dissenter than it
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would be to offer him an elaborate justification for one’s certainties. This
however does not provide a positive justification for calling the other a
fool or a heretic. That we might be inclined to say such things only goes
to show that we are at an intellectual loss when it comes to the very
foundations of our everyday practices.
Indeed, it is precisely the groundlessness of these practices that one is
confronted with when one faces a person with a different set of certain-
ties and finds that, here, normal ways of arguing break down.28 For
‘when [the limits of attunement] are reached’, as Cavell describes such a
situation in The Claim of Reason, ‘I cannot get below them to firmer
ground. The power I felt in my breath as my words flew to their effect
now vanishes into thin air’, and I am consequently ‘thrown back upon
myself’ (CR: p. 115). This means that, rather than only holding fast to
one’s groundless certainties all the firmer, a confrontation with a deviant
or diverging voice could also give one a little pause. It is perhaps one of
those events in which one might, as Wittgenstein observes, be ‘torn away
from the sureness of the game’ (OC: x 617). And as Cavell continues his
description of a confrontation situation: ‘When my reasons come to an
end and I am thrown back upon myself … I can use the occasion to go
over the ground I had hitherto thought foregone’ (CR: p. 124). This may
then bring one to realize that one always already takes a host of things
for granted simply because one is a member of a particular community,
and that these things are not self-evident from all perspectives:
I may [then] feel that my foregone conclusions were never conclu-
sions I had arrived at, but were merely imbibed by me, merely con-
ventional. I may blunt that realization through hypocrisy or
cynicism or bullying. But I may take the occasion to throw myself
back upon my culture, and ask why we do what we do, judge as we
judge. (CR: p. 125)
Hence, what starts out as a confrontation with a deviant or diverging
voice could develop into a confrontation with oneself and one’s commu-
nity: with the fact that there is no other reason for our eating meat or
our distinguishing between races – to use some of the examples Cavell
himself employs – than that we have always done so until now. This may
take the form of actively questioning some of the community’s certain-
ties in the way Cavell suggests in the quote just given, but it might also,
or as a precursor to such active questioning, lead to a dis- or uncovering
of what one always already takes for granted in the first place. Certain-
ties are, after all, not things one consciously entertains; in this sense, too,
we cannot be said to know what we are certain of.29 When it comes to
the very foundations of our everyday practices, therefore, it should with
Cavell be said that ‘the self is not obvious to the self’ (CR: p. 312). Yet
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as Wittgenstein remarks, even though one has unwittingly come to take
a host of things for granted in the course of one’s upbringing, one can
‘discover them subsequently like the axis around which a body rotates’
(OC: x 152). A confrontation with deviance or divergence, then, might
also lead to self-examination and to self-knowledge.
Having formulated the moral of Wittgenstein’s seemingly dogmatic
remarks in these terms, Cavell’s writings now also suggest a different
way of understanding the fact that certainties cannot be the topic of a
reasoned debate, or a way of understanding that this need not imply
complete irrationality. What I have in mind is Part Three of The Claim
of Reason, in which Cavell examines what the nature of moral judgment
can be said to be, given that it does not take the form of arguing from
shared premises to shared conclusions. This fact is often taken to point
to ‘the failure or irrationality of morality’ (CR: p. 255), yet as Cavell
argues, in the case of morality, too, its limitations need not be inter-
preted as failures. For even if the participants in a moral conversation
lack shared premises and may never arrive at a shared conclusion, this
does not disqualify morality as such; it only indicates that these specific
persons cannot be said to live in the same moral universe.30 Moreover,
even when a moral conversation only leads to a delineation of moral
worlds, so to speak, this does not necessarily leave the participants
empty-handed. Quite the contrary, for it allows them to understand
more fully, or even for the very first time, where they stand with regard
to the other and with regard to themselves. According to Cavell – to
wrap up this much too cursory discussion of Part Three of The Claim –
the rationality of morality consists in its ability to lead ‘to a knowledge
of our own position, of where we stand; in short, to a knowledge and
definition of ourselves’ (CR: p. 312).
Returning to On Certainty, something similar can be said about a
situation in which different certainties ‘really do meet which cannot be
reconciled with one another’ (OC: x 611). To be sure, when confronted
with someone who contradicts one’s fundamental attitudes one might
respond with obstinacy, with name-calling or with proselytism. Such
responses are however not the only possible or even the most valid ones.
As Cavell observes, ‘if I say “They are crazy” or “incomprehensible”
then that is not a fact but my fate for them’ (CR: p. 118) – a fate that
may already indicate something about myself and my community,
namely, ‘its power to exclude, its impotence to include’ (AO: p. 76), as
The Argument of the Ordinary has it. For there are also other ways of
dealing with difference.
Moreover, if a confrontation with deviance or divergence should in
fact be said to form a confrontation with the very groundlessness of
certainties, that fact would be more accurately reflected, not by
automatically excluding or dismissing the dissenter, but by turning one’s
READING ON CERTAINTY THROUGH THE LENS OF CAVELL
13
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
ha
nta
l B
ax
] a
t 0
6:4
5 2
2 A
pr
il 2
01
3 
attention to what one takes for granted oneself. A dogmatic dismissal
could in a Cavellian vein be explained as a projection of the groundless-
ness of one’s own certainties onto the other, and as bespeaking the
misconception that self-knowledge takes care of itself.31 For even if
normal ways of arguing break down at such a point, it pre-eminently
provides one with an opportunity for exploring where exactly one stands,
not only with regard to the other, but also with regard to oneself: for
coming to see what one apparently takes to be unquestionable and
indisputable, and that one does so on no other grounds than one’s
upbringing within a particular socio-cultural context. Temporarily
interrupting the everyday flow of life, such reflection need not lead to a
denunciation of any one of one’s certainties, but it may lead to a better
understanding of the kind of person one is and the kind of community
one belongs to.
5. A Cavellian Reading of On Certainty
My arguments in the foregoing go to show that even though Cavell has
never really engaged himself with On Certainty, the anti-dogmatic read-
ing of Wittgenstein he has developed can be used to understand these
writings too. For as I explained in the third section, On Certainty does
not brush sceptical questions aside as nonsensical without further ado.
While Wittgenstein can, with Cavell, be said to question the sceptic’s
self-understanding, On Certainty first and foremost exposes what Cavell
calls the truth of scepticism, regardless of Turvey’s and McGinn’s cri-
tique of this phrase. Moreover, as I explained in the fourth section, it is
precisely because Wittgenstein recognizes the truth contained in scepti-
cism that he cannot be said to justify the unconditional exclusion of devi-
ant or diverging voices. A confrontation with deviance or divergence,
namely, is at the same time a confrontation with the groundlessness of
one’s own certainties, and it cannot be stated beforehand how one will
respond to such a realization. Explained along Cavellian lines, though, it
should inspire self-examination rather than self-righteousness. Being
thrown back on oneself in such way provides an opportunity for discov-
ering some of the things one always already takes for granted, simply by
virtue of the upbringing one has received. On this reading, then, Witt-
genstein is far from the reactionary thinker that critics like Marcuse and
Badiou have made him out to be.
Yet a Cavellian reading of On Certainty not only puts some of
Wittgenstein’s seemingly dogmatic remarks in a different light; it also
allows for a deepened understanding of the Wittgensteinian concept of
certainty itself. In closing, let me therefore make some corrections or
clarifications to the way I have been using this notion after introducing
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certainties in section two as the elements that make up our picture of
the world, or as the ‘things’ we always already take for granted. For
even though I have emphasized that certainties are non-propositional
and non-intellectual, I have still been talking about them as if certainties
form concrete epistemological objects. This may be hard to avoid when
discussing an epistemological collection of remarks, especially when the
writer himself is not always consistent in his terminology, yet as a Cavel-
lian reading of On Certainty makes unmistakeably clear, certainties do
not make for clearly definable beliefs that a person entertains, not even
clearly definable beliefs that simply go unexpressed.32 That is to say, a
person always already takes a host of things for granted, but this only
shows itself in what this person says and does. Certainties do not play
any active role in our everyday practices and as a result, they can only
be known retrospectively – for instance when philosophically reflecting
on human epistemology, or when confronted with someone who objects
to what one has always taken to stand fast. It is only when the everyday
flow of life is interrupted or taken a step back from that certainties can
be identified.
Moreover, when one subsequently discovers them ‘like the axis around
which a body rotates’ (OC: x 152), it not only seems impossible to list all
the things one takes for a fact on a daily basis, formulating any one of
them in sentence form does not even begin to capture how a taken for
granted fact informs our everyday practices. The certainty that the earth
exists or that people eat meat, for instance – to also use one of Cavell’s
examples again – manifests itself in numerous and very subtle ways: not
only in the things we say and do, but also in the manner in which we do
and say them, as well as in the things we precisely refrain from doing
and saying (like checking to see whether the ground is still there before
stepping out the door, or asking the waiter for a vegetarian meal). State-
ments of the form ‘The earth exists’ or ‘People eat meat’ do not capture
how pervasive and ingrained certainties are.
This perhaps provides another way of understanding Wittgenstein’s
claim that the truths Moore lists cannot be expressed or put into sen-
tence form. It in any case means that coming to see what one takes to
stand fast is not a quick and easy process – not to mention the process
one faces when self-examination reveals certainties about which one no
longer feels comfortable saying ‘This is simply what we do’.33 This brings
me to something else that a Cavellian reading of On Certainty is able to
bring to the fore, namely, that what we take for granted is not just sub-
ject to change34 but is something we are to some extent able to alter
ourselves. Read along Cavellian lines, after all, Wittgenstein provides a
human foundation for human knowledge, and it is not or not always
beyond our power to change our very own actions and reactions.35 Or in
the words of Cavell: ‘What I took as a matter of course … I may come
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to take differently … What I cannot now take as a matter of course I
may come to; I may set it as my task’ (CR: p. 124). To be sure, such a
conversion36 cannot be brought about overnight, and like certainties can
only be known retrospectively, it cannot be stated beforehand how
exactly it will affect everyday practices. This however merely serves to
underscore once more – to finish by returning to my main line of
argument – that read through the lens of Cavell, Wittgenstein is a thin-
ker of modesty and caution rather than an authoritarian know-it-all.37
Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands
Notes
1 See Gellner, 1963: pp. 59–63; Marcuse, 1964: pp. 170–99; Badiou, 1999: pp.
113–40; Badiou, 2011. (Though this latter book focuses on TLP rather than
PI, it takes issue with several notions that are usually associated with the later
Wittgenstein, such as the idea that truth is a mere effect of language games.)
2 See CR: p. xviii; RF: pp. 287–9. For an explanation of the abbreviated refer-
ences I use, see the list in the reference section.
3 CR: pp. 6, 47, 241.
4 See Turvey, 2001; McGinn, 1998, 2004. While McGinn focuses on other mind
rather than external world scepticism and uses other post-PI material to argue
against Cavell, she similarly holds that he is wrong to claim that there is more
to scepticism than a misunderstanding of our everyday practices. She however
agrees with Cavell that a dogmatic dismissal of scepticism will not do –
though she holds that Cavell, in spite of his anti-dogmatic rhetoric and in
contrast to Wittgenstein himself, ends up providing a dogmatic rejection of
scepticism (see McGinn, 1989: pp. 99–100, 160–63). She takes this to result
from Cavell’s failing to offer an account of the workings of our everyday
practices in the way OC does; by reading OC through the lens of Cavell, I
hope to show that a similar account can in fact be found CR.
5 See OC: xx 495, 611.
6 See OC: xx 18, 40, 50, 243, 484, 504.
7 See OC: xx 93, 155, 219, 220, 252, 464, 467.
8 See OC: xx 91, 483, 504, 550.
9 See OC: xx 34, 110, 115, 192, 204, 343, 625.
10 See OC: x 337; cf. OC: xx 163, 345, 346.
11 See OC: xx 7, 115, 174, 272, 308, 358, 360, 415, 446.
12 See OC: xx 93, 94, 95, 162, 167, 233, 262.
13 See OC: xx 87, 110, 159, 204, 402, 427, 501.
14 See OC: xx 108, 111, 264, 327. That certainties can loose their hinge function
and become the topic of discussion themselves is the moral of Wittgenstein’s
river metaphor (OC: xx 96–9).
15 See OC: xx 36, 530.
16 See OC: xx 155, 219, 220, 252, 325. I will however argue in the fourth section
that difference in certainties need not always already imply dismissal and
exclusion.
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17 It should be added that when it comes to certainties, disagreement or loss of
agreement (cf. CR: p. 34) can also not be settled in the way disagreement
about knowledge claims can. This will also be discussed in section four.
18 It should be noted that Cavell continues: ‘where knowing construes itself as
being certain’ (my emphasis). Yet even though Cavell uses exactly the wrong
word here, it will become clear that this is merely a matter of terminology
and that the ideas expressed in CR and OC are in no way contradictory.
19 WhetherWittgenstein can be called a foundationalist is debated; e.g. Stroll, 1994,
argues that he can, whileWilliams, 2007, argues that he cannot.UnlikeWilliams, I
donot think that the label ‘foundationalist’ shouldbe reserved for thosedefending
a traditional version;Wittgensteinmay radically rethink this notionbut heoffers a
form of foundationalism nonetheless. I however agree with Williams that Stroll
does not accurately representOC’s outlook,makingWittgenstein into amore tra-
ditional foundationalist than he is, e.g. by ignoring the interdependence between
knowledge and certainty (cf.Williams, 2007: p. 55; Stroll, 1994: pp. 150–51) and by
suggesting that world pictures are static (cf. Williams, 2007: p. 58; Stroll 1994: pp.
159). The question of foundationalism can also be said to underlie the debate
betweenAffeldtandMulhall (seeAffeldt, 1998;Mulhall, 1998).Explained in these
terms, Affeldt takesMulhall to task for making Cavell/Cavell’sWittgenstein into
toomuch of a standard foundationalist, yet asMulhall can be said to argue, Cavell
canprecisely be used to bring outWittgenstein’s non-traditional foundationalism.
ThismayhoweverrequiremorecarefulformulationsthanMulhall initiallyoffered,
ashehimselfconcedes(seeMulhall,1998:p.41).
20 Cavell accordingly explains that to the extent that his interpretation of
Wittgenstein differs from that of a critic like McGinn, this is not because he
defends something akin to scepticism; see RF pp. 282, 287-289.
21 See CR: pp. 168–89.
22 Compare this to the reading offered by e.g. Stroll, who argues that Wittgenstein
takes sceptical doubt to always already be nonsensical for operating outside the
language game (see Stroll, 1994: pp. 110–12, 139–40). For a more thorough
Cavellian critique of ‘bounds of sense’ readings ofWittgenstein, seeConant, 1998,
2005;Crary, 2007: pp. 96–123;Minar, 2007 (thoughMinar doesnotmentionCavell
explicitly).
23 Cf. OC: xx 348, 461; CR: pp. 206–7
24 Cf. OC: xx 349, 350, 355, 622.
25 See CR: pp. 18–19, 124; AO: p. 82.
26 Cf. CR: pp. 269–70.
27 See AO: pp. 70, 72–3.
28 See AO: pp. 85–6.
29 See RF: p. 289.
30 See CR: pp. 268, 326.
31 See CR: pp. 351, 368.
32 Cf. Minar, 2007: p. 260. Unlike Minar, I however do not think that Wittgen-
stein’s ‘thin’ notion of certainty is due to his merely offering reminders. As I
have argued, OC does not only show where both Moore and the sceptic go
wrong, it also offers an alternative account of human knowledge. This
account is perhaps less robust or more anthropomorphic than Wittgenstein’s
opponents would like, but it is a constructive account nonetheless, not just a
series of reminders. (See Bax, 2011: pp. 15–32, for a more general defence of
a constructive reading of Wittgenstein).
33 See CR: p. 124.
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34 See OC: xx 96, 97, 256, 336. Compare this to Stroll, who repeatedly claims
that certainties cannot be revised and does not seem to allow for changes in
world pictures: Stroll, 1994: pp. 110, 159, 164, 167, 177, 180.
35 Maybe particular certainties can never be changed, e.g. those connected to
certain biological facts; cf. Moyal-Sharrock, 2004: pp. 102-103. Read along
Cavellian lines, however, it should be said that one cannot know beforehand
what is and what is not ‘giveuppable’ when it comes to one’s world picture.
36 See OC: x 92.
37 This research was made possible by the Niels Stensen Foundation. I would
also like to thank the members of the Johns Hopkins Humanities Center for
reintroducing me to Cavell, the participants of the New School Wittgenstein
Workshop for feedback on (what turned out to be an) earlier version of this
paper, and Alice Crary and Martin Stokhof for their help in finalizing it.
Thanks also go out to the anonymous reviewer whose comments enabled me
to improve my argumentation.
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